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1. James, et al., are attempting to replicate and extend earlier studies which
suggest that students majoring in economics are more likely to act self-
interestedly - and are less likely to act cooperatively - than students majoring in
subjects other than economics. Motivating many of these investigations is a
concern that such behavioral differences may reflect ideological divergence
and that the promotion of values and behaviors valued by mainstream
economics may prove increasingly unhelpful in the world that is emerging.
James et al. write that they hope their work "could be a productive source of
discussion about the educational values that are appropriate in the ‘new world
order’ (or disorder, as some would have it)."
Because I share their broader social concerns, I am delighted to have the
opportunity to offer comments on a work that is still in progress and whose
results are still tentative. What I say will consist in a few cautionary notes,
offered in a spirit of cooperation and encouragement. My comments fall under
three headings: the first is a conceptual point; the second concerns a
hermeneutical problem that arises when we try to make sense of the data
obtained from playing the ultimatum bargaining game; the third are some loose
and nontechnical points about the quality of evidence that motivate the
intriguing suggestions at the end of the paper.
2. A conceptual point or two. James et al. work with a contrast between two
extremes. They write, "Social value orientation is a dimension anchored by
those who have an extremely competitive, winner-take-all, individualistic
orientation and those who have an extremely cooperative, share-and-share-
alike, prosocial orientation." This contrast is introduced with reference to a
study by De Dreu & Boles 1998. In that study, De Dreu and Boles (1998, p.
254) actually recognize three motivational orientations:
a prosocial value orientation (those who value their own and
others’ outcomes equally)
an individualistic orientation (those who value their own
outcomes only)
a competitive orientation (those who value doing well at the
other’s expense).
James et al. seem to lump individualistic orientation (which is assumed or
promoted by mainstream economic theory’s notion of rationality) together with
a competitive "winner-take-all" orientation. And that, I think, is a mistake.1
Cooperation can, after all, appeal to a person with an "individualistic
orientation" when cooperation offers the best chance of maximizing his or her
payoff.2 But cooperation cannot, I think, appeal to someone with a competitive
orientation as defined by De Dreu & Boles. The difference has been important
to philosophers – especially to philosophers like David Gauthier and Jan
Narveson3 who want to argue that the basis of morality consists in mutually
beneficial principles arrived at by essentially self-interested individuals.
One must also be careful about suggesting that "competitive values promoted
by at least some economists may have led to a cultural preoccupation with a
‘winner take all’ strategy" – and especially about claming that Frank and
Cook’s The Winner-Take-All Society shows how "the growing inequality
between rich and poor may be partially the result of the widespread
acceptance of the view that competition is rational and that sharing is for
fools." As I read The Winner-Take-All Society, it is about the emergence of
winner-take-all markets. In describing the causes of the emergence of such
markets in Chapter 2 and in outlining proposals in the closing chapter for
minimizing the negative effects of such markets, Frank and Cook don’t seem
to me to stress the effects of an ideology that discourages cooperation.
3. A hermeneutical point. James et al. partially4 replicate Carter and Irons
earlier study of how economics majors and non-economics majors played the
ultimatum bargaining game. While their data doesn’t permit them to make
meaningful comparisons among disciplines within their sample, they do
compare their overall results using Canadian subjects with the overall results
obtained by Carter and Irons using American subjects. On average, Canadian
subjects kept (i.e. proposed for themselves) less than their American
counterparts, while the American subjects were willing to accept less than their
Canadian counterparts. The conclusion James et al. want to draw is this:
"Canadians appear to conform less to the ‘winner take all’ stereotype.
Canadians not only want to share the proceeds more equitably, but also to be
unwilling to accept as little as Americans when they are on the receiving end."5
The mean "amount kept" by the Americans as a whole is $5.77; for the
Canadian sample it appears from the graph to be about $5.20. Assuming that
the difference is statistically significant, what are we to make of it? Does it
really mean that "Canadians … want to share the proceeds more equitably."
That is only one possible way of interpreting their behavior. Game theory
notwithstanding, proposing a 5/5 split may well be the best thing to do from the
point of view of self-interest. To be sure, Carter and Irons suggest that if "both
players act in accordance with the rational/self-interest model" then Responder
prefers any positive offer to $0. "Knowing this," they say, Proposer proposes a
division of $9.50 to herself and $0.50 to Responder. But of course Proposer
doesn’t know that Responder will in fact prefer any positive offer to $0, and in
fact real-life Responders don’t act that way.6 If Proposer is savy, she will try to
estimate the likelihood that various proposals will be accepted by real-life
Responders. A five-five split might well be considered a sure bet – in which
case its expected utility is $5.00 x 1 = $5.00. If a six-four split were estimated
to have an 80% chance of being accepted, then its expected utility is $6.00 x .8
= $4.80. If a nine-one split has only a 20% chance of acceptance, its expected
utility is $9.00 x .2 = $1.80. With such probability estimates, those determined
to maximize expected utility for themselves would propose a five/five split.
In other words, the difference between the Americans and Canadians may not
be due primarily to Canadians’ desire for equitable distribution, but may simply
signal that Canadians are more cautious and conservative when estimating
probabilities, or prefer safer bets to riskier ones.7
More puzzling to me is the question why Canadians are unwilling to accept as
little as Americans (on average, those in the Canadian sample would not
accept less than $3.50, while Americans on average would accept $2.09). We
might take this as evidence that, as Responders, Canadians are insistent on a
more even distribution. But that is not evidence of a willingness to cooperate
on the part of Canadian responders, but rather of an unwillingness to
cooperate with aggressive Proposers.
4. Evidence for the more interesting inferences entertained. James et al.
don’t draw any firm inferences from their prisoner’s game data; indeed, they
warn us that their results are only tentative. They do, however, "entertain" or
hold out for consideration three fascinating inferences on the basis of their
data. Despite the fact that statistical analysis indicates most of the differences
reported in mean defection scores are statistically significant at the .05 level, I
find myself very hesitant even to lean in the direction of these inferences on the
basis of the data gathered so far. Let me offer three comments, that I hope are
constructive and helpful.
(a) The inference that "psychology students defect less (are more
cooperative) than others, including economics majors" – i.e., that it may well
be that it isn’t economics students, but rather psychology students, who are
"different." At this point, I’m not at all inclined toward such an inference. There
are only six subjects in their "Other" category, too few in my opinion to begin to
be representative of the broad range of other disciplines. Moreover, the
subjects are all male, a factor that has a clear effect on the dependent variable
being investigated, namely defection rates. My hesitation is reinforced by the
fact that Frank, Gilovich and Regan, working with much larger subsamples,
appear to have found significant differences between economics students and
the general category of others.
(b) The inference that "it is male psychologists who are different" -- an
inference suggested by the graph summarizing gender/major interaction. Here
again my concern is with the size of the subsamples. The total number of psych
students in the sample was only 11, which means that either the number of
male psych majors was less than six or else the number of female psych
majors was less than six. Moreover, we’re given no indication of how may of
the 17 economics majors were female – though if the sample is representative
of economics majors in this regard, the number of female economics majors in
this study is presumably small8. Statistical analyses notwithstanding, I’m leery
about floating any generalizations from subsamples this small, especially when
subjects are not randomly selected.9
(c) The inference that individuals have a "competitive part" and a
"cooperative part" and that the order in which those parts manifest
themselves varies with gender. This is a fascinating idea, and it shouldn’t be
dismissed out of hand. However, two factors make me skeptical of this reading
without further investigation that lends it considerably more support. (1) It is
quite possible that playing prisoner’s dilemma games is a new experience for
most of the subjects, and the variation in performance may be a sign that
subjects are simply exploring the possibilities of the game.10 It would be
interesting to see what happens when subject are asked to play a large
number of such games. Do subjects eventually fall into a consistent pattern, or
do their responses continue to alternate without any "objective" reason for
variation? (2) There appears to be much more variation in response in this
study than there was in the Frank, Gilovich and Regan study, which had 8 times
as many subjects. Frank, Gilovich and Regan (p. 165) report that 207 of their
subjects either cooperated with or defected from each of their two partners and
only 60 subjects cooperated with one partner and defected on the other. In
other words, only about 20% there subjects were "switch hitters" in a sequence
of two games.
For me, the moral of the observations I’ve labeled (a)-(c) is simply that the
research should proceed apace. The results are potentially suggestive, but
hungry as I am I’d like to see more data before I bite.
Endnotes 
1De Dreu & Boles also exhibit some tendency to lump these two together. See
for instance the passage on p. 257 where the contrast is drawn between those
who adopt cooperative heuristics and those who adopt "competitive heuristics
(such as: 'your gain is my loss,; ' the winner takes all,' and 'never trust your
opponent')…." See also p. 258.
2It is, I think, interesting that in Frank, Gilovich and Regan, in the "unlimited"
version of the experiment subjects were permitted to get to know each other
before playing the prisoner's dilemma game and could make promises not to
defect during the game (though there was no way to enforce such promises).
The authors report, "For subjects in the unlimited subsample, we found that the
difference between economics majors and nonmajors virtually disappears
once subjects are permitted to make promisses to cooperate" (in Frank,
Gilovich and Regan 1993, p. 166).
3Or for that matter, John Rawls, though with a decidedly different cast from that
of Gauthier and Narveson.
4In addition to the differences noted in James' paper, a further difference
consisted in the fact that Carter and Irons worked with 92 subjects divided into
four cells: freshmen economics majors, freshmen non-economics majors,
senior economics majors, and senior non-economics majors.
5James et al. say these results should be interpreted cautiously, because in
their study the "imaginary games" were preceded by "real games, " while in
the Carter and Irons study that was not the case. It is possible, therefore, that
the difference in means between the Canadians and Americans could result
from that particular difference in the two studies.
6Commenting on the Carter Irons study, Frank, Gilovich and Regan report (p.
161) that other researchers have shown that "most highly one-sided offers are
rejected in the name of fairness."
7Several years ago, the American humor magazine Spy had a guide to
spotting Canadians traipsing around American cities. One tell-take sign was
supposed to be that when applying for a job, a Canadian asks about pensions
benefits before asking about salary.
8Or so Frank, Gilovich and Regan think. See p. 164 of their study.
9It is true that James et al. report that subjects were randomly assigned to the
11 triples that played the game. The effect of doing so, however, is not the
same as the effect of randomly assigning subjects to different treatment
groups, since the behavior of the subjects was not affected by which group they
were in - the subjects were not reacting to the behavior of other members of
the group, and every group played the same game according to the same rules
and with the same payoff matrix.
10I think such an explanation can't be ruled out, even though the subjects knew
they would receive no feedback on the consequences of their choices. 
References 
Carter, J. R. and Irons, M. D. (1991). are economists different, and if so, why?
Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 171-177.
De Dreu, C.K.W, and Boles, T. L. (1998). Share and share alike or winner take
all?: The influence of social value orientation upon choice and recall of
negotiation heuristics. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 76: 253-276.
Frank, R. H. and Cook, P. J. (1995). The winner-take-all society. New York:
Penguin.
Frank, R. H., Gilovich T. and Regan, D. T. (1993). Does studying economics
inhibit cooperation? Journal of Economic Perspectives 7: 159-171.
 
